Complexity Theory and the 8% Projected Return on Pension Assets
Cry havoc, and let slip the actuaries!
With apologies to William Shakespeare
Cheap money, persistent disequilibria, actuarial follies & the looming pension fiasco
June 2, 2012
Delaying the day of reckoning – assumed pension asset growth
Yesterday the yield on the 10 year bond of the United States slipped under 1.5% for the first time since December of 1941. At the same time the assumed rates of return for most public pensions in the US remains at 7.5-8.0% – a 600-650 BP (basis points) excess return above the 1.5% benchmark risk free asset. By way of comparison, public equities are normally assumed to return around 350 BP above the risk free rate (over the long term) and alternative investments around 500-900 BP to compensate for the additional risk and loss of liquidity associated with these asset classes. I would like to take a look at the reasonableness of the 8% total return assumption and what it may mean vis-à-vis public policy.
There are around $16 T of pension assets in the US, with about 43% or $6.9 T in defined benefit plans – those in which the risk for the returns lies with the plan sponsor – typically states, municipalities and major corporations. This requires around $550 B in annual returns (both yield and realized gains) to produce the minimum return of 8.0%. These returns are earned on assets including bonds (31% of total or $2.1T), public equities (44% or $3.0 T) and alternative investments (25% or $1.7 T) – typically venture capital and private equity.
Three Cases – The Model, The Actual and the Projected with Rate Increases
I thought that it might be interesting to take a minute to look at the impact of ever declining interest rates on the pension assets of the US – particularly in light of the assumption 8% rates of return on assets into perpetuity.
Shown below are three model cases: 1) Case 1 looks at how actuaries are looking at the present and future for returns by major asset classes. This is important because it tests the reasonableness of their assumptions based on historical norms. 2) Case 2 looks at actual returns for the last several years, and highlights the impact that persistent declines in interest rates to historically low levels have had on asset performance. 3) Case 3 looks at the case when interest rates rise even a little – and what happens to the nations accumulated pension assets and obligations.
Case 1 – Model returns on Actual US Defined Benefit Pension Assets and Assumed returns
Assumes 2.5 % Risk free rate
|
Bonds |
Public Equities |
Alternative Investments |
Total |
|
|
Total Assets |
$2.1 T |
$3.0 T |
$1.7 T |
$6.9 T |
|
Assumed Returns |
3.5% |
6% |
9.5% |
6.0% |
|
Risk Premium above 2.5% |
100 BP |
350 BP |
700 BP |
|
|
Assumed $ Returns |
$73.5 B |
$180 B |
$161.5 B |
$415.0 |
Model Portfolio Produces Shortfall of $135 B or 2.0%
A review of the available literature indicates that the current shortfall in pension assets is about $1.0 T for states and municipalities, and $400 B for corporations, for a total of $1.4 T. This implies a shortfall of $112 B in yield – which is a reasonable confirmation of the $135 B estimate shown above.
It is important to note that the last decade has produced returns far less than the assumed risk adjusted returns shown in the Table above in public equities and alternative investments, and far in excess of the modeled returns in bonds. The superior performance in bonds has been due entirely to the long term secular decline in interest rates, being led by initiatives sponsored by the Fed, beginning under Chairman Greenspan in 1987.
The Secular decline in interest rates has propelled bond returns
Case 2 – Typical Recent Returns on Actual US Defined Benefit Pension Assets
Assumes 2.5 % Risk free rate
|
Bonds |
Public Equities |
Alternative Investments |
Total |
|
|
Total Assets |
$2.1 T |
$3.0 T |
$1.7 T |
$6.9 T |
|
Typical Returns |
15.5% |
2.5% |
5.0% |
7.0% |
|
Performance Premium above 2.5% |
1300 BP |
0 BP |
250 BP |
|
|
Typical $ Returns |
$325.5 B |
$75 B |
$85 B |
$485.0 |
Typical Return Portfolio Produced Shortfall of $65 B or 1.0%
The impact of the bond portfolio on typical returns in the last few years has been overwhelming. Despite limited success in alternative investments, and the virtual stall in public equities, the returns on bonds has vastly outperformed other asset classes (and all reasonable expectations). This has been due entirely to the decline in interest rates, as the overall credit quality has deteriorated markedly in all sectors other than corporate debt. This decline in interest rates is obviously a one-way ticket, as interest rates cannot go below zero, and will under normal conditions return to historical norms. The question is – what happens when interest rates rise to the returns illustrated below?
Case 3 – Model returns on Actual US Defined Benefit Pension Assets and Assuming Interest rate increases – to 7%
(Assumes 7 % Risk free rate)
|
Bonds |
Public Equities |
Alternative Investments |
Total |
|
|
Total Assets |
$2.1 T |
$3.0 T |
$1.7 T |
$6.9 T |
|
Projected Returns |
(15)% |
7% |
7.0% |
0.2% |
|
Performance Premium above 2.5% |
(1750) BP |
0 BP |
0 BP |
|
|
Case 3 Model $ Returns |
($315 B) |
$210 B |
$119 B |
$14.0 |
Model (increasing rates) Return Portfolio Produces Shortfall of $536 B or 8.0%
A Persistent Disequilibrium- Strip Mining the Yield Curve
Complexity theory would suggest that any persistent disequilibrium causes complex systems to increasingly consume resources and then degrade into chaos as the disequilibrium ends. The multi-decade decline in interest rates – driven entirely by the Fed – has been intended to stimulate economic activity as the Fed uses its limited tool kit to fulfill its dual mandate. After running out of room to lower rates at the short end of the curve, the Fed switched to targeting the long end – effectively strip mining the yield curve – and leaving a pile of slag and overburden for future generations. As Case 3 above illustrates, even a modest increase in interest rates will create an irreparable hole in the fabric of the American pension system – a future turn of events artfully disguised by the actuarial legerdemain of projecting 8% returns in a 1.5% environment.
It is important to note that the concept of maintaining robust equity and alternative investment yields in Case 3 above is more an of actuarial mercy than a hard eyed view of reality. We have seen the circumstances in which interest rates hit 7% in Europe – and it has a devastating impact on equity values and alternative investments as well. In Case 4 Below, I consider more realistic case in which all asset classes get suitably whacked as interest rates rise – it is not hard to imagine.
Case 4 – Stress Test Recent Returns on Actual US Defined Benefit Pension Assets
Assumes 7.0 % Risk free rate
|
Bonds |
Public Equities |
Alternative Investments |
Total |
|
|
Total Assets |
$2.1 T |
$3.0 T |
$1.7 T |
$6.9 T |
|
Typical Returns |
(15)% |
(20%) |
(30)% |
(20%) |
|
Performance Premium above 2.5% |
(1750) BP |
(2250)BP |
(3250) BP |
|
|
Typical $ Returns |
($315 B) |
$(600) B |
$(510) B |
$(1.4)T |
While Case 4 may be perceived as unnecessarily draconian by the actuarial community – which is considering 8% returns proceeding happily into the future, it is considerably less dire than we saw at the start of the great recession, and considerably better than the situation in much of Europe today.
When the going gets rough – run for the exits
On Friday, GM and Ford both announced plans to exit as many of their defined benefit pension obligations as possible – both through lump sum distributions and annuities purchased through third parties. These are currently profitable companies – currently enjoying a renaissance in domestic auto demand. They are clearly responding to actuarial assumptions which are lagging reality – the assumptions of 8% returns – and the end of the bond market run. They are getting out of the pension business for a very simple reason – because they can.
Very small items – like an assumption of unrealistic returns on pension assets – can have markedly outsized impacts on complex systems – like the world economy. The projected rate of return of 8% is wholly unrealistic based on current interest rates, and wholly unsupportable when considered relative to the only existing comparable – Japan. These seemingly small and innocuous points of actuarial fantasy are precisely the triggers for future chaotic market conditions.
Can you hear the butterfly’s wings flapping?
























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